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ABSTRACT 
 
Maritime Cyber Security: A Comparative Analysis Of U.S. And International Regulation On 
AIS Data Receptors 
 
Sarah Hamrock 
Department of Maritime Administration 
Texas A&M University 
 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Joan Mileski 
Department of Maritime Administration 
Texas A&M University 
 
 
Cyber security is a problem within the maritime industry because of the introduction and 
continuous implementation of technologies, including automation and digitization of processes 
among others. This consequently adds new vulnerabilities within ports, ships, offshore rigs and 
submersibles systems. As a result, recent number of incidents show that commercial shipping has 
taken a more reactive than proactive approach. Compared to other industries, the maritime sector 
does not employ centralized monitoring of information flow through traffic controllers, like 
aviation. This means that any device using Internet of Things (IoT) can transmit and receive 
information that is captured and shared for various (unknown) purposes. This is the case with 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) data that has proliferated. and has potentially become a 
target for cyber-attack. Is every ship equipped with AIS devices? Are there rules for sending and 
receiving the AIS data? What is/are the enforcement mechanisms? Why should commercial 
maritime companies care? In this sense, this research examines the regulation on AIS data 
transmitters and receptors. The analysis is conducted with a comparison of international and 
national laws. The International reference is the IMO (International Maritime Organization) and 
as National (the United States), as one of the top countries targeted for cyber-attacks. The results 
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show that international regulation is broad and United States regulation is more restrict and 
specific. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
AIS  Automatic Identification System 
CFR  Code of Federal Regulations 
GT  Gross Tonnage 
IMO  International Maritime Organization 
IoT  Internet of Things 
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea 
USCG  United States Coast Guard 
VHF  Very High Frequency 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Cyber security in commercial maritime shipping is easily recognized as a sub-set of 
activities within the maritime business sector. The project considers three fronts in relation to 
cyber risk assessment: the operational characteristics; the level and detail of information; and the 
end-user relationship with cyber technologies. In this sense, within this research, we are using 
the risk assessment methodology provided by U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to map the threats, 
vulnerabilities and consequences of the proliferation of AIS data in commercial maritime 
shipping. Consequences, otherwise known as assets, refer to the value for the company; for 
example, within the maritime industry, a ship would be a prime example. It is then important to 
identify the vulnerabilities on the ship as a shipping company can reduce its vulnerabilities 
easier. Threats are difficult to map due to the stigma of “we don’t know what we don’t know.”  
Providing a focus on the commercial sector of shipping, specifically towards the user-
perspective as well as management-based, within this project will display a cost-centered 
approach to making decisions within corporations. As a result, the understanding of this 
approach will show how much the company’s risks will cost and increases the chances of being 
able to purchase an insurance policy. The insurance policy’s intended goal is to reduce the risk 
on the number of incidences detected. 
This thesis utilizes risk assessment while examining laws pertaining to AIS data in the 
Gulf of Mexico while also analyzing these laws currently enforced regarding AIS data as well as 
applied to the United States. This thesis contains two chapters. 
Chapter I presents specific information regarding AIS data, its specifics within a ship, 
and so forth. The current laws, or lack thereof, represent the seriousness of this problem that will 
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harm companies in commercial maritime shipping. Included are rules from IMO (e.g. SOLAS) 
and USCG CFR (first sourced from the USCG’s Navigation Center). 
Chapter II evaluates the AIS laws in a comparative analysis focusing on transmitters and 
receptors. Additionally, this chapter maps out the AIS receptors/receivers, initiating that these 
systems are considered vulnerable for maritime companies as well as for the cyber infrastructure 
within the maritime industry.  
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CHAPTER II 
        LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Using the word “cyber” is a shortened expression for cyberspace. As stated by Biener et 
al (2014), cyber space is recognized to represent the interactive domain that comprises all digital 
networks used to store, modify and communicate information. This definition comprises all 
information systems that businesses, infrastructure and services depend on for support 
techniques. Cyber risk is relevant to cyberspace due to the basis of how both insurance and 
financial markets are regulated to, say, operational risks; a company must identify its 
vulnerabilities as well as map out threats in order to understand the risk within. 
Cyber risk, included in Biener et al (2014), is referenced to a variety of risks that affect 
the firm’s assets informationally and technologically. One form similar to this that both affects 
the average person as well as a multi-billion-dollar shipping firm includes identity threat. Cyber 
risk also is referred to the involvement with malicious electronic events that cause the disruption 
of business and monetary loss (Mukhopadhyay et al (2005)). In addition, there are risks involved 
in a failing information system; with this considered, cyber risk is also referred to as information 
security risk. In Ferber (2013), many diverse economies globally are latching onto the IoT within 
business models that are specifically more web-based than the former. 
Cyber security within the maritime industry is a re-introduced notion due to new 
innovations modifying not only terminology used in the industry but also the way business is 
operated within the industry. In this part, various terms and concepts are displayed that affect the 
maritime sector, yet there is not a universal term to define its potency. Focusing primarily on the 
commercial side, searching for terms that are useful to understand for the present and the future 
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of the maritime industry is worthy for investigation, as this is the direction for the way the 
industry is leading. 
Maritime cybersecurity is a rapidly growing division within the maritime industry, due to 
the continuous technological innovations and advancements. As a result, there is a disconnect 
with the maritime sector in its means to catch-up, causing vulnerabilities as well as threats to 
protrude. The research by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) (2008), the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) (2002), and other maritime- and non-maritime-concentrated 
institutions also identify that these issues need to be recognized and to have efforts in place to 
mitigate these from occurring once more. To determine the importance of cyber security in its 
relationship to technological advancements such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS), it 
is vital to identify the terms and their relationship with these technological developments. 
Recent research by Wang and Mileski (2018) has demonstrated that the maritime industry 
is behind in regard to the application of business strategy when compared to other international 
business sectors. This includes cyber infrastructure of ships, ports, offshore rigs and 
submersibles, which are continuously introduced as result of the incorporation of technology and 
among other factors, the automation and digitization of processes. Considering its nature, 
purpose and functionalities, the maritime industry is exposed to cyber risk, which is potentially 
increased with the exponential use of Internet of Things (IoT). As displayed in Figure 1, utilizing 
IoT is efficient and fast, but it is significantly unstructured (Robinson, 2015).  
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Figure 1: Data Analytics In Terms of Volume and Velocity vs. Variety 
 
Source: Robinson (2015)  
 
This constitutes a revolutionary force in the maritime industry due to an increase in the 
velocity (speed), variety, and volume of information being available. However, as a result, new 
vulnerabilities to the maritime industry were added and recent incidents show the sector has 
taken a more reactive than proactive approach. Kusi (2015) has identified threats and 
vulnerabilities of certain ports, giving brief insight of other issues that can promote cyber 
security threats and vulnerabilities. In fact, cyber risk is part of risk assessment that any 
organization (commercial, military, etc.) should have and, as such, several aspects could be taken 
in consideration depending on the threats and consequences mapped. Fitton (2015) shows the 
effects of extensive security of cyber aspects, such as defense and offense and the pattern of 
investment, will change within the future. Any risk assessment should consider at least three 
levels of analysis, including the physical, the legal and economical. Salem (2018) addresses that 
the prime action to find cyber threats and vulnerabilities is to “conduct cybersecurity risk 
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assessments.” The problem of cyber risk is precisely its potential devastating consequences in all 
of these three levels and beyond (like financial reputation and environmental damages). Lacy et 
al. (2014) addresses this issue, mentioning that few companies successfully generated new 
revenue and efficient business models. Differently from other industries, like Aviation, in 
maritime there is no centralized overview over the information flow through traffic controllers. 
In other words, this means that any device on a ship using IoT can transmit and receive 
information that is captured, stores, and shared to various (unknown) purposes (Robinson, 2015). 
This is the case with Automatic Identification System (AIS) data has proliferated and is being 
commercialized by various, but data accuracy is yet to be improved (Mileski et al, 2018). 
This literature indicated that while relevant and widely used by maritime shipping 
companies, AIS data transmission and reception represent a threat in the realm of maritime cyber 
security. The literature on transmitters and receivers is concentrated in technical aspects and as 
such, we identify a gap in the analysis in the regulation of AIS data devices as such, this is the 
focus of this research. 
 
Thesis Statement 
 The AIS as technology is not new in its applications to commercial maritime shipping, 
but because of IoT, the AIS data proliferation represents a threat to the maritime cyber security. 
While the current literature focus on technical aspects, we state there is a need of comparing the 
sufficiency and enforcement of existing laws associated with AIS transmission and reception. 
Being United States one of the most targeted countries for cyber-attacks, we examine the U.S. 
laws in a comparative analysis with international regulation determined by the IMO.  
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Theoretical Framework 
 This research employs the framework provided USCG for risk assessment. According to 
this framework, risk can be assessed as mapping of the threats vulnerabilities and consequences. 
Figure 2 illustrates that overlap, being assets the corresponding variable for consequences. 
 
Figure 2: The Cyber Risk Assessment 
  
Sourced by: Hsia (2017)  
 
Hsia (2017) parallels with the later-discussed United States Coast Guard (USCG) risk 
assessment; however, further explaining that not only should a company identify its threats and 
vulnerabilities, but also to assess the company’s assets that have the highest impact along with 
value and risk, portrayed in Figure 2. Introducing the usage of the framework NIST (2018) 
provided is geared toward mitigating and reducing such cybersecurity risks. Fitton et al (2015) 
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has shown how the effects of extensive security of cyber aspects, such as defense and offense 
and the pattern of investment, will change within the future. Any risk assessment should consider 
at least three levels of analysis, including the physical, the legal and economical. Salem (2018) 
addresses that the prime action to find cyber threats and vulnerabilities is to “conduct 
cybersecurity risk assessments.” The problem of cyber risk is precisely its potential devastating 
consequences in all of these three levels and beyond like financial reputation and environmental 
damages. In our case, the proliferation of AIS data is considered the threat and the regulation a 
vulnerability on the national security level in commercial maritime shipping. Additional research 
would be required to map other vulnerabilities on commercial companies’ level as well as the 
consequences. 
 
Project Description 
This research can be described as comparative analysis of AIS regulation in the 
international and national jurisdiction. The comparison uses secondary data provided by 
International Maritime Organization (IMO)/Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and United States 
Coast Guard (USCG)/Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). I use the IMO for investigating the 
existence of sufficiency and enforcement of regulation pertaining to AIS transmitters and 
receptors for commercial maritime shipping (military use is excluded here). United States was 
selected as the national case to be studied considering the relevance of maritime industry to the 
country economy (include here the 90% of everything) and the fact that is one of the top 10 
countries targeted for cyber attacks. The analysis leads us to the following results, such as 
insufficiency due to laws lacking in depth enforcement and laws that do not cover all risks. 
These two categories identifying can lead to loopholes within these laws.  
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CHAPTER III 
WHAT IS AIS AND HOW IT WORKS IN MARITIME SHIPPING 
 
AIS is defined as the Automatic Identification System. Title 33, Code of Federal 
Regulations § 164.46 Automatic Identification System (2015) expresses that AIS is the 
communication system that ships refer back to for safety and navigational purposes. AIS 
includes data relative to the vessel, such as what the vessel looks like, where the vessel is 
located, the speed of the vessel, and other relevant safety information whether that is from an 
exchange of data and communication from ship to ship or ship via server. In addition, the vessel 
can also receive data such as port information.  
There are currently three types of AIS equipment: Class A, Class B, and receive only. 
Class A is required for vessels over 300GT (ongoing international voyages) and vessels over 
150GT but is allowed for vessels less than 150GT that would normally be eligible for Class B 
AIS equipment (FOOTNOTE: SOLAS 2.2). Class A AIS equipment transmits more information 
and a higher speed and power than Class B while also receiving data at a quicker pace. Both 
Class A and B, however, are required to obtain a GPS receptor due the ability to manage vessels’ 
precise timing, derived from GPS (per RayMarine). The receiving only category includes 
utilizing AIS data from the Internet by AIS providers. The business these providers make is to 
sell the data by collecting the data from numerous receiving points and amassing these data into 
the big picture. Vulnerabilities occur within this market, however. There are gaps in certain areas 
where signals will not pick up. Additionally, false reporting, spoofing, and multipathing and 
ghost-targeting remain difficult to prevent and reduce within this specific area. Furthermore, a 
professional at RayMarine mentioned that these data providers are not transmitting via VHF; 
instead, these providers are transmitting data to the Internet via phone data system. 
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Access to receive AIS information throughout the global via satellite is a recent 
advancement. There are numerous AIS data providers that grant the user access normally 
through a subscription, usually aimed to aid fleet operators. Most commonly used include 
MarineTraffic (a Greek data provider), exactEarth (a Canadian data provider) and many more. 
Additionally, AIS receiver equipment may include two receivers for monitoring frequency 
purposes. 
 
3.1 International Laws: IMO 
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) that is properly installed will need to comply 
with the guidelines of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Resolution A.917(22) as 
well as the Safety of Navigation Circulars (SN/Circ.) 227, 244, 245, and SN.1/Circ.289; or 
National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) Installation Standard 0400-3.10 in lieu of 
SN/Circ. 227 and 245 (reference § 164.03). The International Telecommunication Union is in 
charge of not only recognizing the characteristics within AIS but also in the relationship with 
VHF mobility, which resulted in the action of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to 
adopt these as a prototype for standards in AIS technology. Additionally, the International 
Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) (2016) presents 
many laws that, while in cooperation with IMO (recognizing its involvement with the IMO), are 
to be followed in regard to AIS data (Table 1). The following includes a list of international laws 
in relation to AIS data from the IALA.  
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Table 1: Contains laws established within the IALA. 
LAW DESCRIPTION 
3.1.1. TIMING 
Ensure that the devices are synchronized (2250 slots per minute),  
every AIS needs to contain the following system: Global  
Navigation Satellite Reciever System (GNSS, for example, the  
Global Positioning system GPS), providing the universal time  
coordinated (UTC) as a reference. If this becomes lost,  
synchronization is provided by other mobile units or AIS Base  
Stations in the area. 
3.2 VHF DATA 
LINK 
 
The AIS has been designed for short range, VHF coverage,  
normally referred to as ‘line of sight’. Although most AIS  
messages only use one (1) slot, some can occupy up to five (5)  
consecutive time slots.  The greater the number of slots used by a  
message, and the larger the number of vessels in a coverage area,  
the greater the potential for the data packet (slot) collisions.  
Since most AIS base stations typically have a high antenna position, 
large coverage area, this may result in messages not being, large  
coverage area, this may result in messages not being decoded from 
more distant AIS units in an area where there are a very large number 
of AIS stations operating. However, data from these distant stations 
would continue to be transmitted and received correctly by closer  
AIS stations. Class A stations also broadcast a Long Range AIS  
broadcast Message (Message 27) every 3 minutes on two VHF  
channels 75 (AIS3) and 76 (AIS4) for satellite reception. This  
message should be suppressed when the Class A station is within an  
AIS Base station coverage area by the group assignment message  
from the controlling base station. 
3.4. DISPLAY 
OF AIS DATA 
 
AIS data can be displayed in different ways. AIS class A must have  
a Minimum Keyboard and Display (MKD), primarily intended for  
installation but displaying AIS target, name, bearing and range.  On  
vessels with AIS compliant navigational displays (IEC 62288), the  
manner in which targets are displayed depends on the type of AIS  
data: Ship dynamic data are typically displayed as triangular shaped  
icons (see Figure 2); Ship static data is typically shown as a textbox;  
Safety messages are also shown as a textbox; AIS AtoN messages as  
diamond shaped icons. Meteorological and hydrological data in  
alphanumeric and / or in a graphical manner. 
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3.6.3.6. 
CHANNEL 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Channel management provides the ability to ‘require’ ships within a  
defined area to transmit and receive AIS on frequencies other than the  
two international dedicated AIS frequencies (AIS1, AIS2).  This can be  
accomplished by sending a channel management message on the existing  
AIS frequencies or on DSC (Digital Selective 
Calling) channel 70. The alternate channel(s) chosen  
must be free from other VHF traffic.  This channel management can be  
used where the existing AIS frequencies are not available for use, if there  
is interference on existing AIS frequencies or in areas of high activity  
on the VDL (VHF Data Link). 
Source: Author own elaboration based on IALA AIS Guidelines (2016) 
 
According to SOLAS Annex 17 – Automatic Identification System (AIS) (2002) 
(featured in Table 2), shipborne AIS systems nonstop transmits data to each other via vessel to 
vessels and VTS stations. Suitable graphical display needs to be utilized as AIS sourced on 
vessel is facilitates quick performance of involuntary information, using Closest Point of 
Approach (CPA) and Time to Closest Point of Approach (TCPA) from the position information 
transmitted by the target vessels. 
 
Table 2: Contains the laws and regulations for AIS receivers/receptors in IMO SOLAS Annex 12 
& Annex 17 
 
LAW DESCRIPTION 
IMO: Annex 12.1(a) 
Adopts recommendation on Performance Standards for 
Shipborne Combined GPS/GLONASS Receiver 
Equipment 
IMO: Annex 12.1.1.2. 
A combined receiver, when compared to either the 
GPS or GLONASS receiver, offers improved 
availability, integrity, accuracy and resistance to 
interference; increased ease of installation, and the 
ability to operate in the differential GPS mode (DGPS), 
differential GLONASS (DGLONASS) mode and the 
combined DGPS and DGLONASS mode, when 
available. 
IMO: Annex 12. 3.1.1.1 
Performance Standards for Combined GPS/GLONASS 
Receiver Equipment; The combined GPS/GLONASS 
receiver equipment should: be capable of receiving and 
processing Standard Positioning Service (SPS) signals 
of the GPS as modified by Selective Availability (SA) 
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and range code signals in GLONASS and provide 
position information in latitude and longitude World 
Geodetic System (WGS) 84 co-ordinates in degrees, 
minutes and thousandths of minutes…Where the facit 
exists, the display and any data output should indicate 
that the co-ordinate conversation is being performed 
and should identify the co-ordinate system in which the 
position is expressed; 
12.3.3.1.3 
The AIS should comprise a means to automatically 
input data from other sensors meeting the provisions as 
specified in paragraph 6.2  
12.3.3.1.4 
CAPABILITY 
The AIS should comprise: a means to input and 
retrieve data manually. 
12..3.1.5 The AIS should comprise a means of checking the transmitted and received data 
IMO: Annex 12.3.2.1 
The AIS should be capable of: providing information 
automatically and continuously to a competent 
authority and other ships, without involvement of 
ship’s personnel; 
IMO: Annex 12.3.2.2 
The AIS should be capable of: receiving and 
processing information from other sources, including 
that from a competent authority and from other ships; 
IMO: Annex 12.3.2.3 
The AIS should be capable of: responding to high 
priority and safety related calls with a minimum of 
delay; and 
IMO: Annex 12.3.2.4 
The AIS should be capable of: providing positional and 
maneuvering information at a data rate adequate to 
facilitate accurate tracking by a competent authority 
and other ships. 
IMO: Annex 17.35 
INHERENT LIMITATIONS ON AIS: The accuracy of 
AIS information received is only as good as the 
accuracy of the AIS information transmitted. 
IMO: Annex 17.38 
INHERENT LIMITATIONS ON AIS: It would not be 
prudent for the OOW to assume that the information 
received from other ships is of a comparable quality 
and accuracy as that which might be available on own 
ship. 
Annex 17.44 
AIS IN VTS OPERATIONS: Pseudo AIS Information: 
VTS centres may send information about vessels which 
are not carrying AIS and which are tracked only by 
VTS radar, via the AIS to vessels equipped with AIS. 
Any pseudo AIS target broadcast by VTS should be 
clearly identified as such. Particular care should always 
be taken when using information which has been 
relayed by a third party. Accuracy of these targets may 
not be as accurate as actual directly-received targets 
and the information content may not be as complete. 
Source: Author own elaboration based on IMO SOLAS Annex 12 and 17 (2002) 
 
To note, Annex 17.51.1 also consists of the following equipment: antennas, one VHF 
transmitter; two multi-channel VHF receivers; one channel 70 VHF receiver for channel 
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management; a central processing unit (CPU); an electronic position fixing system, Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver for timing purpose and position redundancy; 
interfaces to heading and speed devices and to other shipborne sensors; interfaces to heading and 
speed devices and to other shipborne sensors; interfaces to radar/Automatic Radar Plotting Aids 
(ARPA), Electronic Chart System/Electronic Chart Display and Information System 
(ECS/ECDIS) and Integrated Navigation Systems (INS); BIIT (Built In Integrity Test); and 
minimum display and keyboard to input and retrieve data. Figure 3 will allow visualization on 
these systems and allow a basis for understanding these systems. 
 
Figure 3: The Components of an onboard AIS  
 
Sourced by: SOLAS (2015) Annex 17 51.1  
 
Figure 3 depicts the general requirements of the AIS receptors/receivers in that it only 
specifically states that the receiver retrieves data that is sent to the Central Processing Unit 
(CPU) within the system. Due to the goal of increasing its effectiveness, allowing AIS to operate 
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similar to a stand alone system, it would have to include a graphical display or the integration of 
the AIS data display in devices such as INS (Integrated Navigation System), ECS/ECDIS 
(Electronic Chart System/Electronic Chart Display and Information), or radar displays. 
Additional information includes that the AIS can either connect to an additional dedicated AIS 
display unit or to an existing navigational system such as ECS/ECDIS, radar, and/or participate 
with integrating with an existing navigation system (SOLAS Annex 17, 51.5). 
On board AIS data information is both transmitted uninterruptedly and automatically 
without any intervention or knowledge of the officer of the watch (OOW). Fitting to Annex 17 
(2002), an AIS station might require updates on information from a specific ship by “polling” 
that ship, or alternatively, might wish to “poll” all ships within a defined sea area. However, the 
shore station can only increase the ships’ reporting rate but not decrease it. The AIS information 
transmitted by a ship is of three different types: fixed (also known as static) information, which 
is entered into the AIS through installation and need only be changed if the ship changes its 
name or undergoes a major conversion from one ship type to another; dynamic information, 
which, apart from ‘Navigational status’ information, (automatically updates from the ship 
sensors connected to AIS); and voyage-related information, (manual input and updated during 
the voyage). 
 
3.2 National Laws: United States 
The United States Coast Guard initiated rules regarding the AIS onboard ships. Here, the 
CFR displays the IMO SOLAS Annex 12 and 17 laws on a significantly descriptive level. This is 
shown in Figure 4, where the US shares slightly more than a quarter of the pie chart. As a main 
target for attacks, namely in maritime, laws need to cause awareness to these vulnerabilities. In 
addition, laws may continue in gaps, or loopholes, that make it simpler for hackers and terrorists 
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to infiltrate systems, such as AIS data, remotely. The United States Coast Guard established the 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in ways that vessels and maritime entities can comply and 
mitigate issues and attacks due to vulnerabilities. Violation of these laws includes penalties such 
as fines for each violation committed in that period (43-46 CFR), further explained at the near-
end of the paper. Due to the strength, or lack thereof, may cause a loophole in the laws that 
should be addressed.  
 
Figure 4: The top-Ten Frequently Cyber-Attacked Countries  
 
Source: Kaspersky Lab (2013)  
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Table 3: Contains the laws and regulations for AIS and AIS receivers/receptors under the United 
States Coast Guard Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).  
LAW  
Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations 
(AIS REQUIREMENTS) 
DESCRIPTION 
§ 164.01 Applicability (a) This part (except as specifically limited by 
this section) applies to each self-propelled 
vessel of 1600 or more gross tons (except as 
provided in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this 
section, or for foreign vessels described 
in §164.02) when it is operating in the 
navigable waters of the United States except 
the St. Lawrence Seaway. 
(b) * * * 
(c) Provisions of §§ 164.11(a)(2) and 
(c), 164.30, 164.33, and 164.46 do not apply 
to warships or other vessels owned, leased, or 
operated by the United States Government 
and used only in government noncommercial 
service when these vessels are equipped with 
electronic navigation systems that have met 
the applicable agency regulations regarding 
navigation safety. 
(d) Provisions of § 164.46 apply to some self-
propelled vessels of less than 1600 gross 
tonnage. 
§ 164.46 Automatic Identification System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (a) Definitions.  As used in this section-– 
     Automatic Identification 
Systems or AIS means a maritime navigation 
safety communications system standardized 
by the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), adopted by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), that-- 
     (1) Provides vessel information, including 
the vessel’s identity, type, position, course, 
speed, navigational status and other safety-
related information automatically to 
appropriately equipped shore stations, other 
ships, and aircraft; 
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§ 164.46 Automatic Identification System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     (2) Receives automatically such 
information from similarly fitted ships, 
monitors and tracks ships; and 
     (3) Exchanges data with shore-based 
facilities. 
   Gross tonnage means tonnage as defined 
under the International Convention on 
Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969. 
    International voyage means a voyage from 
a country to which the present International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Seaapplies to a port outside such country, or 
conversely. 
    Properly installed, operational means an 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) that is 
installed and operated using the guidelines set 
forth by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) 
Resolution A.917(22) and Safety of 
Navigation Circulars 
(SN/Circ.) 227, 244, 245, and SN.1/Circ.289; 
or National Marine Electronics Association 
(NMEA) Installation Standard 0400-3.10 in 
lieu of SN/Circ.227 and 245 (incorporated by 
reference, see § 164.03). 
 (b) AIS carriage. 
     (1) AIS Class A device. The following 
vessels must have on board a properly 
installed, operational USCG Type-
approved* AIS Class A device: 
(i) A self-propelled vessel of 65 feet or more 
in length, engaged in commercial service. 
(ii) A towing vessel of 26 feet or more in 
length and more than 600 horsepower, 
engaged in commercial service. 
(iii) A self-propelled vessel that 
is certificated to carry more than 
150 passengers. 
(iv) A self-propelled vessel engaged in 
dredging operations in or near a commercial 
channel or shipping fairway in a manner 
likely to restrict or affect navigation of other 
vessels. 
(v) A self-propelled vessel engaged in the 
movement of – 
     (A) Certain dangerous cargo as defined in 
subpart C of part 160 of this chapter, or 
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     (B) Flammable or combustible liquid 
cargo in bulk that is listed in 46 CFR 30.25–1, 
Table 30.25–1. 
    (2) AIS Class B device. AIS Class B device 
in lieu of an AIS Class A device is 
permissible on the following vessels if they 
are not subject to pilotage by other than the 
vessel Master or crew: 
(i) fishing industry vessels; 
(ii) Vessels identified in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of 
this section that are certificated to carry less 
than 150 passengers and that– 
     (A) Do not operate in a Vessel Traffic 
Service (VTS) or Vessel Movement 
Reporting System (VMRS) area defined 
in Table 161.12(c) of § 161.12 of this chapter, 
and 
     (B) Do not operate at speeds in excess of 
14 knots; and 
(iii) Vessels identified in paragraph (b)(1)(iv) 
of this section engaged in dredging 
operations. 
(c) SOLAS provisions. The following self-
propelled vessels must comply with 
International Convention for Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), as amended, Chapter 
V, regulation 19.2.1.6 (Positioning System), 
19.2.4 (AIS Class A), and 19.2.3.5 
(Transmitting Heading Device) or 19.2.5.1 
(Gyro Compass) as applicable (Incorporated 
by reference, see § 164.03): 
    (1) A vessel of 300 gross tonnage or more, 
on an international voyage. 
    (2) A vessel of 150 gross tonnage or more, 
when carrying more than 12 passengers on an 
international voyage. 
(d) Operations. The requirements in this 
paragraph are applicable to any vessel 
equipped with AIS. 
    (1) Use of AIS does not relieve the vessel 
of the requirements to sound whistle signals 
or display lights or shapes in accordance with 
the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS), 28 
U.S.T. 3459, T.I.A.S. 8587, or Inland 
Navigation Rules, 33 CFR part 83; nor of the 
radio requirements of the Vessel Bridge-to-
Bridge Radiotelephone Act, 33 U.S.C. 1201-
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1208, part 26of this chapter, and 47 CFR part 
80. 
     (2) AIS must be maintained in effective 
operating condition, which includes-- 
(i) The ability to reinitialize the AIS, 
which requires access to and knowledge 
of the AIS power source and password; 
(ii) The ability to access AIS 
information from the primary conning 
position of the vessel; 
(iii) The accurate broadcast of a 
properly assigned Maritime Mobile 
Service Identity (MMSI) number; 
(iv) The accurate input and upkeep of 
all AIS data fields and system updates; 
and 
(v) For those vessels denoted in 
paragraph (b) of this section, the 
continual operation of AIS and its 
associated devices (e.g., positioning 
system, gyro, converters, displays) at 
all times while the vessel is underway 
or at anchor, and, if moored, at least 15 
minutes prior to getting underway; 
except when its operation would 
compromise the safety or security of 
the vessel or a security incident is 
imminent. The AIS should be re`ed to 
continuous operation as soon as the 
compromise has been mitigated or the 
security incident has passed. The time 
and reason for the silent period should 
be recorded in the ship's official log and 
reported to the nearest Captain of the 
Port or Vessel Traffic Center (VTC). 
    (3) AIS safety-related text messaging must 
be conducted in English and solely to 
exchange or communicate pertinent 
navigation safety information (analogous to a 
SECURITE broadcast). Although not 
prohibited, AIS text messaging should not be 
relied upon as the primary means for 
broadcasting distress (MAYDAY) or urgent 
(PAN PAN) communications. (47 CFR 
80.1109, Distress, urgency, and safety 
communications). 
    (4) AIS application-specific 
messaging (ASMs) is permissible, but is 
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limited to applications adopted by the 
International Maritime Organization (such 
as IMO SN.1/Circ.289) or those denoted in 
the International Association of Marine Aids 
to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities’ 
(IALA) ASM Collection for use in the United 
States or Canada, and to no more than one 
ASM per minute. 
 
Note to paragraph (d):  The Coast Guard has 
developed the “U.S. AIS Encoding Guide” to 
help ensure consistent and accurate data 
encoding (input) by AIS users.  This Guide is 
available at our “AIS Frequently Asked 
Questions” (FAQ #2) World Wide Web page 
at https://www.navcen.uscg.gov.  Although of 
great benefit, the interfacing or installation of 
other external devices or displays (e.g., 
transmitting heading device, gyro, rate of turn 
indicator, electronic charting systems, and 
radar), is not currently required except as 
denoted in § 164.46(c).  Most application-
specific messages require interfacing to an 
external system that is capable of their 
portrayal, such as equipment certified to meet 
Radio Technical Commission for Maritime 
Services (RTCM) electronic chart system 
(ECS) standard 10900 series. 
 
(e)  Watchkeeping.  AIS is primarily intended 
for use by the Master or person in charge of 
the vessel, or by the person designated by the 
Master or person in charge to pilot or direct 
the movement of the vessel, who must 
maintain a periodic watch for AIS 
information. 
 
(f)  Portable AIS.  The use of a portable AIS 
is permissible only to the extent that 
electromagnetic interference does not affect 
the proper function of existing navigation and 
communication equipment on board and such 
that only one AIS device may be transmitting 
on board a vessel at any one time. 
(g)  AIS Pilot Plug.  The AIS Pilot Plug on 
any vessel subject to pilotage by other than 
the vessel Master or crew must be readily 
available and easily accessible from the 
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primary conning position of the vessel and 
permanently affixed (not an extension cord) 
and adjacent (within 3 feet) to a 120-volt 
50/60 Hz AC power receptacle (NEMA 5-15). 
 
(h)  Exceptions.  The following vessels may 
seek up to a 5-year deviation from the AIS 
requirements of this section by requesting a 
deviation under § 164.55.              
     (1) Vessels that operate solely within a 
very confined area (e.g., less than a 1 
nautical-mile radius, shipyard, or barge 
fleeting facility); 
     (2) Vessels that conduct only short 
voyages (less than 1 nautical mile) on a fixed 
schedule (e.g., a bank-to-bank river ferry 
service or a tender vessel); 
     (3) Vessels that are not likely to encounter 
other AIS-equipped vessels; 
     (4) Vessels whose design or construction 
makes it impracticable to operate an AIS 
device (e.g., those that lack electrical power, 
have an exposed or open cabin, or are 
submersible); or 
     (5) Vessels denoted in paragraph (b)(2) 
that seek a deviation from requirements in 
paragraphs (d)(2)(ii) and (e) of this section 
because their AIS Class B device lacks a 
display. 
 
(i)  Prohibition.  Except for maritime support 
stations (see 47 CFR 80.5) licensed by the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
broadcasts from AIS Class A or B devices on 
aircraft, non-self propelled vessels or from 
land are prohibited. 
 
(j)  Implementation date.  Those vessels 
identified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this 
section that were not previously subject to 
AIS carriage must install AIS no later than 
March 1st, 2016 [eff. 81 FR 20250, 4/7/16].  
§ 164.46 Automatic Identification System 
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Note to paragraph (b): Under 33 U.S.C. 
1223(b)(3) and 33 CFR 160.111, a Coast 
Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) may 
restrict the operation of a vessel if he or she 
determines that by reason of weather, 
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visibility, sea conditions, port congestion, 
other hazardous circumstances, or the 
condition of such vessel, the restriction is 
justified in the interest of safety. In certain 
circumstances, if a COTP is concerned that 
the operation of a vessel not subject to 
§ 164.46 would be unsafe, the COTP may 
determine that voluntary installation of AIS 
by the operator would mitigate that concern. 
Source: Author own elaboration based on USCG CFR (2015) 
  
The area of focus is on the United States laws mainly because how stringent their policies 
are compared with other countries around the world but also because the U.S. is the most 
vulnerable when it comes to cyber attacks. In a publication report by Kaspersky Lab (2013) 
shared that the United States is the most frequently attacked country. The US Coast Guard 
established the Codes of Federal Regulation (CFR) (featured in Table 3) as of March 2015 to 
increase the strength of the current international laws listed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
4.1  Methodology 
This analysis was conducted in three steps. First, AIS regulations were collected from 
international and national authorities. Second, a filter in the regulation was applied to identify the 
specific chapters and items associated with AIS transmitters/receptors. Third, a comparative 
analysis was conducted using two main criteria: sufficiency and enforcement. Sufficiency is 
defined as if the regulation covers description of the capability of receivers or specifies 
additional receiver equipment information (Merriam-Webster 2011). In order to check on this 
criterium, we basically verified the existence of that information. As for enforcement, it is 
defined as how the regulation is implemented and what is the process of compliance verified by 
the authority. In our analysis we have verified if the regulation gives enough mechanisms of 
enforcement to the authority.  
The data used is secondary data gathered directly from IMO/SOLAS and USCG/CFR 
available in their respective virtual libraries (i.e. ebscoHOST, WorldCat, GoogleScholar all 
which aid researchers to retrieve information at a faster pace). Being the IMO and USCG the 
responsible authorities in their respective international and national regulation for maritime 
shipping, we consider that was no need for additional step to validate their data. Finally, two 
tables were created to enable side-by-side comparison.  
 
4.2   Comparative Analysis 
In this section we have conducted the comparative analysis of national and international 
regulation on AIS data transmission and reception. These laws are distinguished by the amount 
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of vulnerabilities and defined if there are gaps and loopholes within these laws for receptors. 
Two tables (Table 4 and Table 5) are presented to identify the laws if there are gaps within 
enforcement and sufficiency criteria. 
 
Table 4. INTERNATIONAL LAW: Vulnerability factors listed within the laws specifically 
towards AIS receivers   
LAW DESCRIPTION SUFFICIENCY ENFORCEMENT 
IMO: Annex 12. 3.1.1 
 
Performance Standards for 
Combined GPS/GLONASS 
Receiver Equipment; The 
combined GPS/GLONASS 
receiver equipment should: 
be capable of receiving and 
processing Standard 
Positioning Service (SPS) 
signals of the GPS as 
modified by Selective 
Availability (SA) and range 
code signals in GLONASS 
and provide position 
information in latitude and 
longitude World Geodetic 
System (WGS) 84 co-
ordinates in degrees, 
minutes and thousandths of 
minutes…Where the facility 
exists, the display and any 
data output should indicate 
that the co-ordinate 
conversation is being 
performed and should 
identify the co-ordinate 
system in which the position 
is expressed; 
SUFFICIENT:  
COVERS DESCRIPTION 
OF THE CAPABILITY OF 
RECEIVERS; SPECIFIES 
ADDITIONAL RECEIVER 
EQUIPMENT 
INFORMATION  
ENFORCED: NOT 
NECESSARILY, 
DOES NOT 
MENTION HOW IT 
IS ENFORCED BUT 
DUE TO ITS 
SPECIFIC 
DESCRIPTION 
IMO: Annex 12.3.1.4 
 
CAPABILITY 
The AIS should comprise: a 
means to input and retrieve 
data manually; 
 
SUFFICIENT: LACKING, 
DOES NOT SPECIFIY 
NOR ESTABLISH THE 
ENFORCED: 
LACKING, 
DUE TO 
DEFICIENCY IN 
SPECIFICATION 
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MEANS, CAUSING A 
LOOPHOLE IN THE LAW  
 
IMO: Annex 12.3.1.5 
 
The AIS should comprise a 
means of checking the 
transmitted and received 
data; 
 
SUFFICIENT: LACKING, 
NEEDS TO SPECIFIY THE 
MEANS 
ENFORCED: 
LACKING, DUE TO 
DEFICIENCY IN 
SPECIFICATION 
IMO: Annex 12.3.2.2 
 
The AIS should be capable 
of: receiving and processing 
information from other 
sources, including that from 
a competent authority and 
from other ships; 
SUFFICIENT: LACKING, 
DOES NOT ADDRESS AN 
ESTABLISHED WAY 
HOW (NEEDS 
STANDARDIZATION) 
ENFORCED: 
LACKING, NEEDS 
TO SPECIFY 
“COMPETENT.” 
TOO BROAD 
IMO: Annex 12.3.2.3 
 
The AIS should be capable 
of: responding to high 
priority and safety related 
calls with a minimum of 
delay; and 
SUFFICIENT: 
ADDRESSES SAFETY 
COMMUNICATION 
ENFORCED: 
SPECIFY TYPE OF 
CALLS 
IMO: Annex 17.35 
 
INHERENT 
LIMITATIONS ON AIS: 
The accuracy of AIS 
information received is only 
as good as the accuracy of 
the AIS information 
transmitted. 
SUFFICIENT: LACKING,  
NO FURTHER 
EXPLANATION IN 
REGARDS TO 
ACCURACY 
ENFORCED: 
LACKING, NO 
FURTHER 
INFORMATION 
IMO: Annex 17.38 
 
INHERENT 
LIMITATIONS ON AIS: It 
would not be prudent for the 
OOW to assume that the 
information received from 
other ships is of a 
comparable quality and 
accuracy as that which 
might be available on own 
ship. 
SUFFICIENT: 
ADDRESSES A 
REQUIRED POSITION 
AND ACTION 
ENFORCED: 
NOT 
NECESSARILY, 
CONSIDERED 
MORE AS A 
SUGGESTION 
IMO: Annex 17.44 
 
AIS IN VTS 
OPERATIONS: Pseudo AIS 
Information: VTS centres 
may send information about 
vessels which are not 
carrying AIS and which are 
tracked only by VTS radar, 
SUFFICIENT:  
COVERS DESCRIPTION 
OF THE CAPABILITY OF 
RECEIVERS; SPECIFIES 
ENFORCED: 
 DOES NOT 
MENTION HOW IT 
IS ENFORCED BUT 
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via the AIS to vessels 
equipped with AIS. Any 
pseudo AIS target broadcast 
by VTS should be clearly 
identified as such. Particular 
care should always be taken 
when using information 
which has been relayed by a 
third party. Accuracy of 
these targets may not be as 
accurate as actual directly-
received targets and the 
information content may not 
be as complete. 
ADDITIONAL RECEIVER 
EQUIPMENT 
INFORMATION  
DUE TO ITS 
SPECIFIC 
DESCRIPTION 
Soource: Author’s own elaboration based on IMO/SOLAS (2015). 
Table 5. NATIONAL (U.S.): Vulnerability factors listed within the laws specifically towards 
AIS receivers 
LAW  
Title 33, Code of 
Federal Regulations 
(AIS 
REQUIREMENTS) 
DESCRIPTION SUFFI-CIENCY 
ENFORCE-
MENT 
§ 164.01 
Applicability 
(a) This part (except as specifically limited 
by this section) applies to each self-
propelled vessel of 1600 or more gross 
tons (except as provided in paragraphs (c) 
and (d) of this section, or for foreign 
vessels described in §164.02) when it is 
operating in the navigable waters of the 
United States except the St. Lawrence 
Seaway. 
(b) * * * 
(c) Provisions of §§ 164.11(a)(2) and 
(c), 164.30, 164.33, and 164.46 do not 
apply to warships or other vessels owned, 
leased, or operated by the United States 
Government and used only in government 
SUFFICIENT:  
COVERS 
DESCRIPTION OF 
THE CAPABILITY 
OF RECEIVERS; 
SPECIFIES 
ADDITIONAL 
RECEIVER 
EQUIPMENT 
INFORMATION  
ENFORCED: 
PROVIDES 
ENFORCEMENT 
BY SPECIFYING 
SOLELY WHAT 
VESSEL IS 
UNDER 
COMPLIANCE  
FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 
LAW 
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noncommercial service when these vessels 
are equipped with electronic navigation 
systems that have met the applicable 
agency regulations regarding navigation 
safety. 
(d) Provisions of § 164.46 apply to some 
self-propelled vessels of less than 1600 
gross tonnage. 
§ 164.46 Automatic 
Identification 
System 
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 (a) Definitions.  As used in this section-– 
     Automatic Identification 
Systems or AIS means a maritime 
navigation safety communications system 
standardized by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), adopted 
by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), that-- 
     (1) Provides vessel information, 
including the vessel’s identity, type, 
position, course, speed, navigational status 
and other safety-related information 
automatically to appropriately equipped 
shore stations, other ships, and aircraft; 
     (2) Receives automatically such 
information from similarly fitted ships, 
monitors and tracks ships; and 
     (3) Exchanges data with shore-based 
facilities. 
   Gross tonnage means tonnage as defined 
under the International Convention on 
Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969. 
    International voyage means a voyage 
from a country to which the 
present International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Seaapplies to a port 
outside such country, or conversely. 
    Properly installed, operational means 
an Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
that is installed and operated using 
the guidelines set forth by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) 
Resolution A.917(22) and Safety of 
Navigation Circulars 
(SN/Circ.) 227, 244, 245, 
and SN.1/Circ.289; or National Marine 
Electronics Association (NMEA) 
Installation Standard 0400-3.10 in lieu of 
SN/Circ.227 and 245 (incorporated by 
SUFFICIENT: 
ESTABLISHES 
SPECIFIC 
INFORMATION 
REGARDING AIS 
RECEPTORS, 
SPECIFICALLY 
ESTABLISHED 
CONDITIONS FOR 
THE VESSEL AND 
ITS SYSTEMS; 
EXTREMELY 
SPECIFIC, 
LENGTHY 
REGULATION 
COVERS 
DESCRIPTION OF 
THE CAPABILITY 
OF RECEIVERS; 
SPECIFIES 
ADDITIONAL 
RECEIVER 
EQUIPMENT 
INFORMATION 
ENFORCED: 
PROVIDES 
ENFORCEMENT 
BY SPECIFYING 
SOLELY WHAT 
COMPLIANCE  
FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 
LAW AS WELL 
AS ITS LAW FOR 
INTERNATIONAL 
LAW; CFR IS 
MORE 
STRINGENT ON 
ENFORCEMENT 
WITH AIS LAWS 
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reference, see § 164.03). 
 (b) AIS carriage. 
     (1) AIS Class A device. The following 
vessels must have on board a properly 
installed, operational USCG Type-
approved* AIS Class A device: 
(i) A self-propelled vessel of 65 feet or 
more in length, engaged in commercial 
service. 
(ii) A towing vessel of 26 feet or more in 
length and more than 600 horsepower, 
engaged in commercial service. 
(iii) A self-propelled vessel that 
is certificated to carry more than 
150 passengers. 
(iv) A self-propelled vessel engaged in 
dredging operations in or near a 
commercial channel or shipping fairway in 
a manner likely to restrict or affect 
navigation of other vessels. 
(v) A self-propelled vessel engaged in the 
movement of – 
     (A) Certain dangerous cargo as defined 
in subpart C of part 160 of this chapter, or 
     (B) Flammable or combustible liquid 
cargo in bulk that is listed in 46 CFR 
30.25–1, Table 30.25–1. 
    (2) AIS Class B device. AIS Class 
B device in lieu of an AIS Class A device 
is permissible on the following vessels if 
they are not subject to pilotage by other 
than the vessel Master or crew: 
(i) fishing industry vessels; 
(ii) Vessels identified in paragraph 
(b)(1)(i) of this section that are certificated 
to carry less than 150 passengers and that– 
     (A) Do not operate in a Vessel Traffic 
Service (VTS) or Vessel Movement 
Reporting System (VMRS) area defined 
in Table 161.12(c) of § 161.12 of this 
chapter, and 
     (B) Do not operate at speeds in excess 
of 14 knots; and 
(iii) Vessels identified in paragraph 
(b)(1)(iv) of this section engaged in 
dredging operations. 
(c) SOLAS provisions. The following self-
propelled vessels must comply with 
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International Convention for Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS), as amended, Chapter 
V, regulation 19.2.1.6 (Positioning 
System), 19.2.4 (AIS Class A), and 
19.2.3.5 (Transmitting Heading Device) or 
19.2.5.1 (Gyro Compass) as applicable 
(Incorporated by reference, see § 164.03): 
    (1) A vessel of 300 gross tonnage or 
more, on an international voyage. 
    (2) A vessel of 150 gross tonnage or 
more, when carrying more than 
12 passengers on an international voyage. 
(d) Operations. The requirements in this 
paragraph are applicable to any vessel 
equipped with AIS. 
    (1) Use of AIS does not relieve the 
vessel of the requirements to sound whistle 
signals or display lights or shapes in 
accordance with the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS), 28 U.S.T. 
3459, T.I.A.S. 8587, or Inland Navigation 
Rules, 33 CFR part 83; nor of the radio 
requirements of the Vessel Bridge-to-
Bridge Radiotelephone Act, 33 U.S.C. 
1201-1208, part 26of this chapter, and 47 
CFR part 80. 
     (2) AIS must be maintained in effective 
operating condition, which includes-- 
(i) The ability to reinitialize the AIS, 
which requires access to and 
knowledge of the AIS power source 
and password; 
(ii) The ability to access AIS 
information from the primary 
conning position of the vessel; 
(iii) The accurate broadcast of a 
properly assigned Maritime Mobile 
Service Identity (MMSI) number; 
(iv) The accurate input and upkeep 
of all AIS data fields and system 
updates; and 
(v) For those vessels denoted in 
paragraph (b) of this section, the 
continual operation of AIS and its 
associated devices (e.g., positioning 
system, gyro, converters, displays) at 
all times while the vessel is 
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underway or at anchor, and, if 
moored, at least 15 minutes prior to 
getting underway; except when its 
operation would compromise the 
safety or security of the vessel or a 
security incident is imminent. The 
AIS should be re`ed to continuous 
operation as soon as the compromise 
has been mitigated or the security 
incident has passed. The time and 
reason for the silent period should be 
recorded in the ship's official log and 
reported to the nearest Captain of the 
Port or Vessel Traffic Center (VTC). 
    (3) AIS safety-related text 
messaging must be conducted in English 
and solely to exchange or communicate 
pertinent navigation safety information 
(analogous to a SECURITE broadcast). 
Although not prohibited, AIS text 
messaging should not be relied upon as the 
primary means for broadcasting distress 
(MAYDAY) or urgent (PAN PAN) 
communications. (47 CFR 80.1109, 
Distress, urgency, and safety 
communications). 
    (4) AIS application-specific 
messaging (ASMs) is permissible, but is 
limited to applications adopted by the 
International Maritime Organization (such 
as IMO SN.1/Circ.289) or those denoted in 
the International Association of Marine 
Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse 
Authorities’ (IALA) ASM Collection for 
use in the United States or Canada, and to 
no more than one ASM per minute. 
 
Note to paragraph (d):  The Coast Guard 
has developed the “U.S. AIS Encoding 
Guide” to help ensure consistent and 
accurate data encoding (input) by AIS 
users.  This Guide is available at our “AIS 
Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQ #2) 
World Wide Web page 
at https://www.navcen.uscg.gov.  Although 
of great benefit, the interfacing or 
installation of other external devices or 
displays (e.g., transmitting heading device, 
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 164.46 Automatic 
Identification 
System 
 
 
gyro, rate of turn indicator, electronic 
charting systems, and radar), is not 
currently required except as denoted in § 
164.46(c).  Most application-specific 
messages require interfacing to an external 
system that is capable of their portrayal, 
such as equipment certified to meet Radio 
Technical Commission for Maritime 
Services (RTCM) electronic chart system 
(ECS) standard 10900 series. 
 
(e)  Watchkeeping.  AIS is primarily 
intended for use by the Master or person in 
charge of the vessel, or by the person 
designated by the Master or person in 
charge to pilot or direct the movement of 
the vessel, who must maintain a periodic 
watch for AIS information. 
 
(f)  Portable AIS.  The use of a portable 
AIS is permissible only to the extent that 
electromagnetic interference does not 
affect the proper function of existing 
navigation and communication equipment 
on board and such that only one AIS 
device may be transmitting on board a 
vessel at any one time. 
(g)  AIS Pilot Plug.  The AIS Pilot Plug on 
any vessel subject to pilotage by other than 
the vessel Master or crew must be readily 
available and easily accessible from the 
primary conning position of the vessel and 
permanently affixed (not an extension 
cord) and adjacent (within 3 feet) to a 120-
volt 50/60 Hz AC power receptacle 
(NEMA 5-15). 
 
(h)  Exceptions.  The following vessels 
may seek up to a 5-year deviation from the 
AIS requirements of this section by 
requesting a deviation under 
§ 164.55.              
     (1) Vessels that operate solely within a 
very confined area (e.g., less than a 1 
nautical-mile radius, shipyard, or barge 
fleeting facility); 
     (2) Vessels that conduct only short 
voyages (less than 1 nautical mile) on a 
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fixed schedule (e.g., a bank-to-bank river 
ferry service or a tender vessel); 
     (3) Vessels that are not likely to 
encounter other AIS-equipped vessels; 
     (4) Vessels whose design or 
construction makes it impracticable to 
operate an AIS device (e.g., those that lack 
electrical power, have an exposed or open 
cabin, or are submersible); or 
     (5) Vessels denoted in paragraph (b)(2) 
that seek a deviation from requirements in 
paragraphs (d)(2)(ii) and (e) of this section 
because their AIS Class B device lacks a 
display. 
 
(i)  Prohibition.  Except for maritime 
support stations (see 47 CFR 80.5) 
licensed by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), broadcasts from AIS 
Class A or B devices on aircraft, non-self 
propelled vessels or from land are 
prohibited. 
 
(j)  Implementation date.  Those vessels 
identified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this 
section that were not previously subject to 
AIS carriage must install AIS no later than 
March 1st, 2016 [eff. 81 FR 20250, 
4/7/16].  
§ 164.46 Automatic 
Identification 
System (ADD-IN) 
 
Note to paragraph (b): Under 33 U.S.C. 
1223(b)(3) and 33 CFR 160.111, a Coast 
Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) may 
restrict the operation of a vessel if he or 
she determines that by reason of weather, 
visibility, sea conditions, port congestion, 
other hazardous circumstances, or the 
condition of such vessel, the restriction is 
justified in the interest of safety. In certain 
circumstances, if a COTP is concerned that 
the operation of a vessel not subject to 
§ 164.46 would be unsafe, the COTP may 
determine that voluntary installation of 
AIS by the operator would mitigate that 
concern. 
SUFFICIENT: 
ESTABLISHES 
SPECIFIC 
INFORMATION 
REGARDING 
PREVIOUS 
SECTION, 
SPECIFICALLY 
ESTABLISHED 
CONDITIONS FOR 
VESSEL SAFETY 
AND 
VULNERABILITIES 
ENFORCED: 
PROVIDES 
ENFORCEMENT 
BY SPECIFYING 
SOLELY WHAT 
COMPLIANCE  
FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 
LAW AS WELL 
AS ITS LAW FOR 
INTERNATIONAL 
LAW; CFR IS 
MORE 
STRINGENT ON 
ENFORCEMENT 
WITH AIS LAWS 
Source: Author own elaboration based on USCG CFR (2002) 
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The analysis of data presented on Table 4 and 5 show the various contrasts between 
international law and national law. The CFR/National laws tend to describe and explain AIS 
clearer and at more length than the IMO/International laws. Additionally, the results listed 
display, specifically for the AIS receptor, that there is potential that the system itself is a 
vulnerability. These laws, at a national and international level, distinctively are shown multiple 
differences as stated earlier, are not addressing the stringency of these laws. 
Moreover, the international laws in Table A compared with the national laws are 
significantly broader; therefore, these laws are easily taken advantage over due to the numerous 
loopholes found in these international laws such as ways that countries under SOLAS can 
retrieve data for both its transmitters and receivers and also to check if the data is able to receive 
and transmit. The Code of Federal Regulations in Table B goes above and beyond in comparison 
to the IMO SOLAS Annex 12 and 17 laws in Table A because of their specifics with not only 
what is being addressed in each law but what also is being enforced. A quick observation of the 
two laws noted that the Table B laws are significantly lengthier than the Table A laws, which can 
result in the content of the laws and its specifics. Another consideration of the reason for the less 
amount of length in the international laws is most likely due to having a wider number of 
countries compliable to these laws, ranging from developed and developing nations. 
However, the laws are missing separate legislation specifically for receptors. Both laws 
currently combine the receptors/receivers with the transponder/transmitter. This leaves specifics 
out for both the transmitters and receivers, resulting in loopholes for what actions can be passed 
and cannot be passed.  
Still, vulnerabilities within AIS data include, per Lloyd’s Register (2018), lack of “an 
inbuilt mechanism to encrypt or authenticate signals, considered a soft target for cyber attack.” 
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Other vulnerabilities from Lloyd’s Register (2018) include that “AIS communications do not 
employ authentication or integrity checks; communication is made over RF. Anyone with cheap 
RF receiver can also ‘listen’ to these messages. (Range dependent).” Attackers can easily 
comprise AIS which can prevent a ship from providing movement information due to spoofing, 
ghost-targeting, multipathing, and false reporting on emergencies. Online services are often 
misled due to these events. False signals can dominate the control of the receptors on a ship, 
causing ships to run off course and other dangerous situations. Additionally, Frantzman (2018) 
mentions “cloaking” is typically used as a way to hide a ship’s movements by turning, or 
switching, off their AIS transponder or transmitter, resulting in a fiscal penalty if the culprit is 
found guilty and will be charged with a minimum of $1,000 per each day the law was violated; 
however, these penalties are known to reach closer to $5,000 to $15,000. This action is seen from 
a range of vessels: from fishing boats to tankers. However, minimum information and research is 
mentioned regarding the AIS receptors. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Maritime cybersecurity is an area that should not go unnoticed. AIS, due to the initiation 
of IoT, represents a threat to the maritime cyber security.  While the current literature focus on 
technical aspects, there is a current need of comparing the sufficiency and enforcement of 
existing laws associated with AIS transmission and reception. AIS within cyber security is 
underrated and undervalued, especially when compared to other known policies that have grown 
to be such a push and focus. Focusing within the United States, it is obvious to state that these 
vulnerabilities are an issue that should not be taken lightly within maritime time companies as it 
currently is.  
This conclusion assesses the studies in regard to maritime cyber security with the use of 
AIS data, specifically in the United States. It provides areas within law that have not been 
addressed currently. Lastly, it will also identify the vulnerabilities within the areas lacking in 
law. 
Focusing more on the national laws, the United States has significant increase in 
enforcement on the AIS laws in regard to AIS receiver equipment; however, there remains areas 
that have not been addressed in law and currently the USCG enforces civil penalties such as fines 
for every day a violation occurs. As these regulations for AIS data become more specific towards 
transponders and receptors, more awareness for these cyber crimes will be present as well as 
ways in which to mitigate. 
Previous research shows that there have been discrepancies within the AIS data, which 
could be resolved having more laws specific to AIS data receptor equip maritime cybersecurity is 
an area that should not go unnoticed. 
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